Motivating Problem:
Roger and Colleen have been placed in two separate interrogation rooms as suspects for breaking the vending machine in DC. They are both guilty, but before committing the crime they agreed that they would both stay quiet if they were to get caught. However, all communication has been lost between the two of them and they are now given the following possible outcomes depending on whether they choose to confess to the crime or stay quiet:

- If they both confess, they will both serve 5 hours of detention.
- If one of them confesses and the other stays quiet, then the one who confessed will serve 0 hours of detention while the one who stayed quiet will serve 10 (the confession is that both of them broke the machine).
- If both of them stay quiet, they will both serve 2 hours of detention.

What should Roger and Colleen do?
Making a Decision...

Roger and Colleen did have an agreement to both stay quiet, but now there is too much at risk for them to trust one another. They must consider what the other person might do to make sure they get the best possible outcome for themselves. Assuming now that Roger wants to minimize his detention time, he must consider the following:

- If Colleen confesses, then Roger’s best decision is to confess.
- If Colleen stays quiet, then Roger’s best decision is to confess.

Let’s circle Rogers’ decisions in red in the table below.

Looking at Colleen’s point of view:

- If Roger is to confess, then Colleen’s best decision is to confess.
- If Roger is to stay quiet, then Colleen’s best decision is to confess.

Let’s box Colleen’s decisions in blue in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confess</th>
<th>Stay Quiet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confess</td>
<td>(5, 5)</td>
<td>(0, 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay Quiet</td>
<td>(10, 0)</td>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You may think, “Why wouldn’t they both stay quiet?”, as it would lead to a better outcome than if they were to both confess. But, if Roger decides to keep their agreement and Colleen decides to break it, then Roger is going to serve 10 hours in detention. Therefore, by using this same logic for Colleen, choosing to confess is the best(safest) option for both of them.
Game Theory - The Prisoner’s Dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confess</th>
<th>Stay Quiet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roger</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess</td>
<td>(5, 5)</td>
<td>(0, 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay Quiet</td>
<td>(10, 0)</td>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Game Theory is the study of deciding on the best strategy to win a game, and applies to games where the decisions of one person affect the decisions of the other(s). When we say “win a game,” this can also be thought of as just satisfying our interests as much as possible, given a certain situation (game). In the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” example, to the win the game meant to get the least amount of detention time as possible. In trying to do so, we found that Roger and Colleen should both confess. This outcome, where they both serve a detention sentence of 5 hours each, is called a *Nash Equilibrium*.

**Nash Equilibrium**

The Nash Equilibrium is the outcome in a game where one player cannot become better off if they individually change their decision. To find this outcome you take the following steps:

- Consider each of the column player’s decisions, and based on each of those decisions, mark the outcome that corresponds to the row player’s best decision.
- Consider each of the row player’s decisions, and based on each of those decisions, mark the outcome that corresponds to the column player’s best decision.
- For the outcomes in the game where the markings you have made intersect, you have a Nash Equilibrium!
**Example.** Find the Nash Equilibrium

Here are the rules for the game below:

- The row player will choose a row and the column player will choose a column.
- Combining these two choices, we land on one square in the table.
- Positive red values are payouts, in dollars, to the row player.
- Negative blue values are payouts, in dollars, to the column player (-2 is pays the column player $2).
- All payouts are made by the losing player (loser pays the winner).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Column</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Row</td>
<td>0  6  2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5  2  1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8  1  0 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The row player’s best response given the column’s player decisions:

- If the column player chooses column 1, then the row player should choose row 2.
- If the column player chooses column 2, then the row player should choose row 1.
- If the column player chooses column 3, then the row player should choose row 2.
- If the column player chooses column 4, then the row player should choose row 3.
The row player’s best possible outcomes are circled in red below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Column</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeating these steps from the point of view of the column player:

- If the row player chooses row 1, then the column player should choose column 4.
- If the row player chooses row 2, then the column player should choose column 3.
- If the row player chooses row 3, then the column player should choose column 1.

The column player’s best possible outcomes are boxed in blue below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Column</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fair and Unfair Games

To check whether a game is fair or unfair we must find the *best strategy* of the game.

**Best Strategy** - the decision in a game that leads to the outcome that is a Nash Equilibrium.

A game is considered **fair** if the *best strategy* of the game leads to an outcome that is just as good for both players. If not, the game is considered **unfair**

Is the game in the previous example considered fair?

No, because the *best strategy of both players will lead to an outcome of $1 to the row player.*
**Bonus Mark Game**

There will be a Gauss Contest preparation test during week 8 of Math Circles this year. Luckily for you, Math Circles is offering up bonus marks! However, instead of just giving you bonus marks, you’re going to earn these bonus marks by playing a game. The rules are as follows:

- On the count of three you can choose to raise your hand or not.
- If everyone raises their hand, the whole class gets two bonus marks.
- If at least one person does not raise their hand, then everyone that did receives 0 bonus marks.
- If you don’t raise your hand, you are guaranteed one bonus mark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You</th>
<th>Hand Up</th>
<th>Hand Down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hand Up</td>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
<td>(0, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Down</td>
<td>(1, 0)</td>
<td>(1, 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let’s find the Nash Equilibrium of this game:

- If the rest of the class puts their hand up, then your best decision is to *put your hand up*.
- If the rest of the class keeps their hand down, then your best decision is to *keep your hand down*.

From the rest of the classes point of view (assuming the rest of the class acts as one person, making one decision):

- If you put your hand up, then the best decision for the rest of the class is to *put their hand up*.
- If you keep your hand down, then the best decision for the rest of the class to *keep their hand down*. 
Notice that we have two Nash Equilibriums for this game! From each of these outcomes, neither player can individually change their decision to get a better outcome. In particular, if the rest of the class has their hand up, you would not want to keep your hand down, because then you would only receive 1 bonus mark instead of 2. Also, if the rest of the class keeps their hand down, you would not want to then put your hand up, because then you would receive 0 bonus marks instead of 1.

In the case that there are two Nash Equilibriums, we have think about what is good about making either decision and what is bad about making either decision, given the rules of the game. When we played this game in class, about half of the class put their hands up, while the other half kept their hands down. The students who put their hands up argued that if their is a chance to receive 2 bonus marks, which is more than 1, then everyone should simply just put their hands up. However, given the rules of the game, since all it took was for one student to keep their hand down and cause the students who put their hands up to receive 0 bonus marks, there was too much risk in trying to get the 2 bonus marks. Therefore, although there may be two Nash Equilibrium, or 2 “best” decisions for all players to make, you must consider the rules of the game while trying to make a decision.

What if the rule was, “If half of the class keeps their hand down, the students who put their hands up receive 0 bonus marks”. Does this change your thinking?
Problem Set

1. Look back to the game we played in the “Example - Find the Nash Equilibrium” section of the handout. What are the Nash Equilibriums of these games? Are these games fair?

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
20 & 0 \\
0 & 20 \\
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{ccc}
10 & 0 & 2 \\
4 & 1 & 3 \\
8 & 4 & 6 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
3 & 4 \\
2 & 0 \\
1 & 2 \\
4 & 3 \\
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{ccc}
3 & 1 & 4 \\
1 & 0 & 2 \\
5 & 2 & 3 \\
3 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{array}
\]

2. Complete the table below which represents the game, “Rock, Paper, Scissors”. Treat a win as having a value of 1 (in red) for the Row Player, a win as having a value of 1 (in blue) for the Column Player, and treat a draw as having a value of zero. If there is one, find a best pure strategy for this game. If not, explain what this could mean when it comes to deciding on a strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Rock</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Scissors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rock</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scissors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Alyssa and Tom are making treats for a bake sale to raise money for new calculators for the school. They are having a hard time deciding whether to make cookies or brownies, since the person who sells the most treats will win a prize. After doing some research within the school, they both find out the following information:

- If Tom and Alyssa both make cookies, then Tom will sell 35 cookies and Alyssa will sell 45 cookies.
- If Tom and Alyssa both make brownies, then Tom will sell 20 brownies and Alyssa will sell 30 brownies.
- If Tom makes cookies and Alyssa makes brownies, then Tom will sell 60 cookies and Alyssa will sell 40 brownies.
- If Tom makes brownies and Alyssa makes cookies, then Tom will sell 30 brownies and Alyssa will sell 70 cookies.

Using the information above to fill in the table with how many treats they each will sell depending on what treat they decide to make. Then

(a) Find the Nash Equilibrium of this game to find out what type of treat each student will make.
(b) Is this a fair competition?
(c) If not, what can Tom do to ensure the bake sale is as successful as possible, regardless if he wins or not?
4. The game is defined as follows:

- Two hunters go out to catch meat.
- There are two rabbits in the range and one stag. The hunters can each bring the equipment necessary to catch one type of animal.
- The stag has more meat than the rabbits combined, but both hunters must chase the stag to catch it.
- Rabbit hunters can catch all of their prey by themselves.
- The values in the table represent the amount of meat (in pounds) the hunters will get depending on what they both choose to hunt.
- Each rabbit provides 1lb of meat and each stag provides 6lbs of meat.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{Hunter 1} & \text{Stag} & \text{Rabbit} \\
\hline
\text{Stag} & & \\
\text{Rabbit} & & \\
\end{array}
\]

Hunter 2

Find the Nash Equilibrium(s) of this game. If there is more than one, what are the pros and cons of choosing the corresponding strategies.
5. * You are the owner of a clothing store and you must decide at what price to sell a hot new suit. You know that your competitor across the street is selling the same suit, so you must take into consideration the price at which they are selling to make sure you attract as many customers as possible. You have the following information:

- If you and your competitor both sell the suit at $50, you will sell 55% of the total number of suits sold between the two of you.
- If you sell the suit at $50 but your competitor sells the suit at $70, you will sell 70% of the total number of suits sold between the two of you.
- If you sell the suit at $70 but your competitor sells the suit at $50, you will sell 40% of the total number of suits sold between the two of you.
- If you and your competitor both sell the suit at $70, you will sell 55% of the total number of suit sold between the two of you.

Represent the above information as a game to answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Competitor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>You</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) If you and your competitor’s main goal is to sell as many suits as possible, what is the best price to sell the suit at?

(b) After doing research, you find out that 100 people will be buying this hot new suit. If you and your competitor’s main goal is to maximize the amount of money made from selling the suit, what is the best price to sell the suit at?
More Types of Games

6. You are given 10 chocolate coins for you and a friend to share, however you get to decide how many chocolate coins each of you gets (you get 10 and your friend gets 0; you get 9 and your friend gets 1; etc.). After you decide, your friend can either accept the offer or decline it. If they decline it, you both get nothing. How would you split the chocolate coins?

7. In the game tic-tac-toe, each player takes a turn to place an X or an O in one of nine spots. The player that forms a straight line of three X’s or a straight line of three O’s is the winner. The first player usually starts by placing an X in the middle spot on the grid.

What are all of the spots player 2 can place an O next to give player 1 a winning strategy?
8. **Twenty-One**

In the game twenty-one, you and a partner take turns subtracting numbers from 21 until one of you reaches zero. Each player can only subtract a number from 1 to 4 during each turn, and the person who reaches zero is the winner.

Play this game with a partner twice, alternating who goes first. Record your numbers in the tables below:

**Game 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Game 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you are the first player, there is a way you can win this game every time. What is this winning strategy?
9. * From the game above

(a) What would be the winning strategy if the game started at 24 instead of 21.
(b) Who would have the winning strategy if the game started at 20.
(c) If you are only allowed to subtract 1 and 2 each time, who has the winning strategy and what is it?

10. * Let’s Make a Deal!
In the old game show Let’s Make a Deal!, contestants are asked to choose between 3 doors. Behind one of the doors is a brand new car, but behind each of the other two doors is a goat. Once the contestant has chosen a door, one of the other two doors is opened, revealing a goat. The contestant is then given a choice to keep the door that he or she has chosen, or switch to the other remaining door. What should the contestant do?

Play this game with a partner. Repeat the game 6 times with you as the contestant (record your results on this sheet), and 6 times with your partner as the contestant (your partner will record his or her results on his or her sheet). Make sure you and your partner choose a different strategy that you will stick with for all 3 trials (ie. you choose to switch doors every time and your partner chooses to keep the same door everytime.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trial #</th>
<th>Door Picked</th>
<th>Door With Goat</th>
<th>Switch/Don’t Switch</th>
<th>Win/Lose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the better strategy?
11. *The Pirate Game*

Five pirates were sailing one day and stumbled upon a treasure chest filled with 10 gold coins. The captain, Nash, and pirates 2, 3, 4, and 5 had to decide how the gold was to be shared. Being the captain, Nash was the first one to make a decision. The rules and conditions of the game are as follows:

**Rules and Conditions:**

- Nash is to propose how the pirates will share the gold, and the rest of them vote whether or not they agree. If Nash gets at least 50% of the vote in his favour, the gold will be shared his way (Nash’s vote counts).

- If the vote is less than 50%, then Nash is thrown off the ship and pirate 2 becomes the captain and the game is repeated.

- The pirates’ first goal is to remain on the ship and their second goal is to maximize the amount of gold coins they get.

- Assume that all 5 pirates are intelligent, rational, greedy, and do not wish to be thrown off the ship.

Nash finds a plan to maximize his gold and stay alive. What is the plan? (Hint: work backwards from the situation if it was just pirates 4 and 5 on the ship. What’s the offer pirate 4 can make? What offer must pirate 5 accept before he is left alone with pirate 4?)